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Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to argue that Blade Runner: The Final
Cut (Ridley Scott, 2007) has cognitive value which is inseparable from its value
as a work of cinema. I introduce the cinematic philosophy debate in §1. §2 sets
out my position: that the Final Cut affirms the proposition there is no necessary
relation between humanity and human beings. I outline the combination of cine-
matic depiction with distinctive features of the narrative’s peripeteia in §3. In §4,
I explain the cognitive value of the peripeteia.
I. EXPERIENTIAL AFFIRMATION
Paisley Livingston established the parameters of the cinematic philosophy
debate with his 2006 paper, ‘Theses on Cinema as Philosophy’.1 In this and
subsequent work, Livingston has maintained that the ‘bold thesis’ of cine-
matic philosophy is too strong to be defended successfully.2 The bold thesis
has two conditions, results and means: the work must make an innovative
and independent contribution to philosophy by a means exclusive to the cine-
matic medium or art form.3 Aaron Smuts refers to these as the ‘epistemic’ and
‘artistic’ criteria respectively, and mounts one of the few defences of the bold
thesis, arguing for two cases of cinematic philosophy: the ‘For God and Coun-
try’ montage sequence of October (Sergei Eisenstein, 1928) and an episode of
The Twilight Zone entitled ‘The Little People’ (William F. Claxton, 1962).4
More recently, I have defended Memento (Christopher Nolan, 2000) as meet-
ing the bold thesis, arguing that the film satisfies both the epistemic and
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artistic criteria in presenting memory as (i) unreliable and (ii) essential to
understanding by means of experiential affirmation.5
Experiential affirmation is a development of Berys Gaut’s ‘experiential
confirmation’ and is defined as: ‘the production of new, justified, true belief
by the employment of cinematic imagery to stimulate the imagination’.6 7 I
was careful to restrict my thesis to Memento, but did not preclude other films
doing philosophy in a similar manner. Experiential affirmation in Memento
is a function of cinematic depiction and narrative complexity. The narrative
complexity of Memento is notorious and Gaut makes no exaggeration when
he states that the film is ‘one of the most narratively complex artworks ever
produced’.8 My position was that these two features combine to produce a
necessary relation between the imaginative engagement with Memento and
the formation of the beliefs that (i) memory is unreliable and (ii) memory is
essential to understanding. If one has attended to the film, in other words,
one cannot help but accept these propositions as true.
Katherine Thomson-Jones identifies the following two questions as essen-
tial to the cognivitist versus anti-cognitivist debate: ‘(1) Can art provide
knowledge? And if it can, (2) how is this aesthetically relevant’.9 I do not
have space to discuss the relationship between aesthetic and artistic value so
I shall characterise cinematic cognitivism as the thesis that a film can pro-
vide knowledge in a manner which is artistically relevant. The two questions
posed by Thomson-Jones mirror Smuts’ epistemic and artistic terminology
such that the bold thesis can be re-stated as: a film can provide philosophical
knowledge in an exclusively cinematic manner. My experiential affirmation
is thus a cinematic cognitivist thesis. As such, the knowledge acquired by ex-
periential affirmation must be accepted as true in the world, not just in (the
world of) the film. Gaut holds that Memento makes cognitive claims, that
‘embedded in the narrative are claims that are readily construed as assertions
about what is the case in the actual world’.10 I have previously demonstrated
how Memento makes cognitive claims by means of experiential affirmation; I
shall now demonstrate that experiential affirmation operates in Blade Runner
and that the film therefore has cognitive value.
II. BLADE RUNNERS
A plot summary of Blade Runner would be redundant given the number of
books and articles inspired by the film, but what is particularly important for
my inquiry—and may, at least in part, account for the continued interest—is
the existence of so many versions. Excluding those edited for television and
minor alterations in the Swedish release, there have been six thus far. [The
Internet Movie Database provides an overview.]11 I shall also exclude the two
which were shown as previews in 1982, which leaves: the International Cut
(1982), the Domestic Cut (1982), the Director’s Cut (1992), and the Final
Cut (2007). I shall further exclude the Domestic Cut (the U.S. release which
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was edited for graphic violence) and the Director’s Cut (as the Final Cut is
billed as the definitive director’s cut) to compare:
(IC) the International Cut of 113 minutes; and
(FC) the Final Cut of 113 minutes. [Both these running times are taken
from the Blade Runner: The Final Cut (5-Disc Ultimate Collectors’ Edition)
released on 3 December 2007.]
There are four significant changes from IC to FC :
(1) the removal of Deckard’s voiceover narration;
(2) the alteration of Batty’s demand of Tyrell from ‘I want more life, fucker ’
to ‘I want more life, father ’;
(3) the insertion of the unicorn sequence; and
(4) the removal of the happy ending.
(1), (3), and (4) combine to alter the viewer’s perception of whether
Deckard is a human being or a replicant. [Androids that are almost iden-
tical to human beings.] Interpretations of both versions vary, with evidence
advanced for Deckard as definitely one or the other as well as ambiguity as
crucial to both works. For my purposes I shall take Deckard to be a human
being in IC and a replicant who thinks he is a human being in FC. The
revelation that Deckard is a replicant in the latter occurs in the final scene
of the film, when he discovers an origami unicorn outside his apartment. In
IC, the unicorn serves only to indicate that Gaff, a police officer, has spared
Rachael’s life and is allowing Deckard to escape with her. The insertion of
the unicorn sequence in the forty-first minute of FC produces a second and
more important layer of meaning, that Gaff has access to Deckard’s thoughts
which—in the context of the film—can only mean that Deckard is a replicant
who thinks he is a human being due to memory implants.
In his paper on the film, Gaut argues that both IC and FC assert that
there is a biological (or descriptive) sense of ‘humanity’ and an evaluative
sense, which is connected with the ability to empathise.12 He states: ‘The
film proposes, then, that empathy is not confined to biological humans, but
that replicants can possess it too’.13 Both versions portray humans and repli-
cants as having and not having empathy as well as characters whose empathy
develops gradually, e.g. Gaff (a human) and Batty (a replicant). The propo-
sition Gaut identifies is obviously a claim about what is true in the film
rather than the world, however, and is not thus ‘cognitive’. My interest is in
whether FC can meet the epistemic criterion for doing philosophy by making
a cognitive claim and I shall therefore alter Gaut’s proposition about biology
and empathy by removing the reference to replicants: there is no necessary
relation between humanity and human beings.
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III. EXPERIENTIAL AFFIRMATION IN BLADE RUNNER
Experiential affirmation in FC occurs by the combination of cinematic depic-
tion with a particular feature of the work’s narrative structure, the placement
of the peripeteia. I shall not discuss cinematic depiction in FC in detail as
its effects are very similar to those in Memento that I described previously.14
Drawing on the work of Kendall Walton and Gregory Currie, I argued that
cinematic depiction produces detailed and lifelike imaginings which audiences
are able to understand with relative ease. In FC, one can immediately perceive
that there is no physical feature which distinguishes replicants from human
beings and that the behavioural differences are only revealed in specific cir-
cumstances, e.g. empathy tests and combat. Furthermore, when characters
such as Rachael and Deckard are introduced as humans and subsequently
revealed to be replicants, no physical or behavioural changes occur. Cine-
matic depiction thus reinforces the superficial similarity between humans and
replicants in a way that the novel upon which the film is based, Philip K.
Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, could not courtesy of the dif-
ferent ways in which the depictive and descriptive modes of representation
stimulate the imagination.
In FC, the peripeteia is Deckard’s realisation that he is a replicant and is
represented as follows (film time in minutes and seconds):
106:49: Deckard opens the door of his apartment, gun in hand, and checks
the corridor. When he is satisfied that it is empty, he beckons Rachael
to move to the lift.
107:14: En route one of her heels clips a silver origami figure, which catches
Deckard’s attention.
107:23: He picks it up and it is revealed to be a unicorn. He holds it in front
of his face, contemplating it.
107:34: He smiles and Gaff’s words are repeated in a voiceover: ‘It’s too bad
she won’t live, but then again who does?’
107:39: Deckard nods, crumples the unicorn, and enters the lift.
107:44: Before he can turn around the lift door closes and the screen is black
for three seconds.
107:48: The credits roll.
Deckard’s discovery is a simultaneous anagnorisis (recognition) and peripe-
teia (reversal of fortune) because the change from ignorance to knowledge is
accompanied by the change from one state of affairs (Deckard as human) to
its opposite (Deckard as replicant). Aristotle [1452a] maintained that this
combination was ‘the most effective form of discovery’ and the peripeteia in
FC is indeed exceptionally effective.15 A reversal of fortune can occur at any
stage of a narrative, but my discussion is restricted to those which occur at
the end of a story, i.e. during the denouement or resolution.
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IV. THE TWIST IN THE TAIL
There are four features of the peripeteia in FC which are relevant to experi-
ential affirmation:
a). it is unexpected because Deckard has been represented as a human
being thus far;
b). has retrospective significance, i.e. casts the whole narrative up to this
point in a fresh light by introducing new layers of meaning;
c). occurs quickly; and
d). occurs in the final few seconds of the film.
The effect in FC is best examined by comparison with two other films where
the peripeteia shares features (1) and (2), M. Night Shymalan’s Unbreakable
(2000) and Roger Donaldson’s No Way Out (1987). In Unbreakable, reluctant
superhero David Dunn realises that Elijah Price is not in fact his friend and
mentor, but an arch-villain. As in FC, this revelation casts a fresh light on
the whole narrative, although it is followed by approximately three minutes
of flashbacks and an explicit explanation by Price, and thus lacks (3) and
(4). The peripeteia in No Way Out has a reversal which shares (1) to (3)
with FC : at the end of a tragic series of events in which he appears to have
played an unwitting role, Lieutenant Commander Farrell is revealed to be
Evgeny Segevich, a KGB agent. The revelation is confirmed when Schiller,
the manager of his apartment block, emerges as his handler. This occurs at
approximately one and a half minutes before the credits roll, but nonetheless
lacks (4).
The earliest point at which a viewer has justification for believing that
Deckard is a replicant in FC is when he picks up the unicorn and the cam-
era focuses on the figure, twenty-one seconds before the screen turns black.
[The first sight of the unicorn, nine seconds before Deckard picks it up, is
too brief to be able to determine what the figure is with certainty.] Deckard
first appears onscreen in the eighth minute of the film and the viewer thus
attributes both descriptive and (a developing) evaluative humanity to him for
approximately one hundred minutes before the two are severed. The crucial
difference between the peripeteia in FC and No Way Out is the lack of time
the audience is afforded to process the radical change of perspective in the
former. Once Farrell/Segevich speaks to Schiller in Russian, there can be no
doubt that he is a Soviet agent and although there is very little of the film
left, there is some explanation. Farrell/Segevich confirms previous suspicion
that the KGB agent is a sleeper and there is a very brief exposition of an
earlier incident where his bag was stolen. This is followed by a similarly brief
dialogue in which Farrell/Segevich refuses to return to the Soviet Union and
the film ends with an aerial shot of him driving away which continues as the
credits roll. Where No Way Out provides one with seventy-odd seconds in
which to consider the implications of the peripeteia with the assistance of a
short explanation, FC provides a maximum of twenty-one seconds unassisted
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in which to consider implications which are much more far-reaching and sub-
tle. Deckard does not comment upon what it means to be human (or, more
accurately, what it means to be a replicant)—he simply gives a stoical nod
and makes good his escape.
Smuts correctly identifies the film-as-thought-experiment defence of cin-
ematic philosophy as flawed because in such cases it is the audience rather
than the film that does the philosophy.16 This is true of IC whether or not
one regards the film as a thought experiment. In presenting a variety of char-
acters, human and replicant, who both possess and lack empathy, and human
and replicant characters whose empathy develops, IC suggests that there is
no necessary relation between humanity and human beings. The narrative
merely provokes this response in the audience, however, and it is the viewer
who must actively explore the theme, make the connections, and ultimately
do the philosophy. There is thus no necessary relation between attending to
IC and accepting the proposition as true.
In FC, the audience is invited to imagine Deckard as descriptively human
and to approve of his growing evaluative humanity as the film progresses.
Then, in the final few seconds, the viewer—like Deckard—experiences the
sudden and abrupt severance of the two senses of ‘human’. Due to the combi-
nation of features (1) to (4) of the peripeteia, there is little time in which to
consider the implications of the reversal and no time in which to re-orientate
one’s attitude towards Deckard; there is also no further character or plot de-
velopment. If one has imaginatively engaged with the work, one has approved
of Deckard’s emerging evaluative humanity and thus has the experience of
seeing someone with whom one has oneself empathised stripped of his de-
scriptive humanity. In No Way Out one has a single opportunity to judge
Farrell/Segevich qua spy (his refusal to return to the Soviet Union), but there
is no further story in which to judge Deckard qua replicant. One’s positive
judgement of Deckard remains the same despite his loss of descriptive human-
ity and one therefore experiences the irrelevance of descriptive humanity to
the judgement of evaluative humanity, i.e. that there is no necessary relation
between humanity and human beings.
In a similar way to the manner in which the complexity of Memento’s
narration affords viewers the experience of their memory as unreliable, the
literally last-minute combination of reversal and recognition in FC affords
viewers the experience of their judgements of evaluative humanity holding in
the absence of descriptive humanity. The features of the peripeteia, depicted
cinematically, are such that one cannot both attend to the film and fail to
accept the truth of the above proposition. The claim made by the film is
cognitive because the severing of the two senses of ‘human’ affects both the
viewer’s judgement of the character in the film (e.g., ‘Deckard is actually a
replicant’) and her second-order judgement thereof (e.g., ‘My judgement of
Deckard as heroic remains accurate’). The claim is thus true of both the film
and the world. In experientially affirming that there is no necessary relation
333
The Cognitive Value of Blade Runner
between humanity and human beings, FC provides knowledge in a manner
which is cinematically relevant. As such, the film has cognitive value which
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